DeepMAL -- Deep Learning Models for Malware Traffic Detection and
  Classification by Marín, Gonzalo et al.
DeepMAL - Deep Learning Models for Malware
Traffic Detection and Classification
Gonzalo Marı´n∗†‡, Pedro Casas∗, Germa´n Capdehourat†§
∗AIT Austrian Institute of Technology, Vienna, Austria
†IIE–FING, Universidad de la Repu´blica, Montevideo, Uruguay
‡Tryo labs, Montevideo, Uruguay
§Plan Ceibal, Montevideo, Uruguay
gonzalo.marin@fing.edu.uy, pedro.casas@ait.ac.at, gcapdehourat@ceibal.edu.uy
Abstract—Robust network security systems are essential to
prevent and mitigate the harming effects of the ever-growing oc-
currence of network attacks. In recent years, machine learning-
based systems have gain popularity for network security appli-
cations, usually considering the application of shallow models,
which rely on the careful engineering of expert, handcrafted
input features. The main limitation of this approach is that
handcrafted features can fail to perform well under different
scenarios and types of attacks. Deep Learning (DL) models
can solve this limitation using their ability to learn feature
representations from raw, non-processed data. In this paper
we explore the power of DL models on the specific problem
of detection and classification of malware network traffic. As a
major advantage with respect to the state of the art, we consider
raw measurements coming directly from the stream of monitored
bytes as input to the proposed models, and evaluate different
raw-traffic feature representations, including packet and flow-
level ones. We introduce DeepMAL, a DL model which is able
to capture the underlying statistics of malicious traffic, without
any sort of expert handcrafted features. Using publicly available
traffic traces containing different families of malware traffic, we
show that DeepMAL can detect and classify malware flows with
high accuracy, outperforming traditional, shallow-like models.
Index Terms—Deep Learning; Network Security; Raw Net-
work Measurements; Malware
I. INTRODUCTION
The popularity of Artificial Intelligence (AI) - and of
Machine Learning (ML) as an approach to AI, has dramat-
ically increased in the last few years due to its outstanding
performance in various domains, notably in image, audio, and
natural language processing, and more recently in gaming.
A major breakthrough in AI/ML has been the successful
application of Deep Learning (DL) models and techniques to
traditional ML tasks. One of the most powerful characteristics
of DL models is their ability to learn feature representations
from input raw or basic, non-processed data. For example,
a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) trained for image
classification can learn to recognize edges and more complex
structures along the sequence of neural layers, using as input
only the image pixel values [1]. The key behind DL is the
so-called representation learning paradigm [2], which offers
a set of methods allowing a ML algorithm to automatically
discover the best data representations or features from raw
data inputs. DL models are basically representation learning
methods with multiple levels of abstraction, obtained by
composing simple but non-linear consecutive transformation
layers, each of them providing a more abstract representation
of the data.
Despite the success of DL models, shallow ML models
are usually applied when it comes to the analysis of network
traffic measurements. Shallow ML models rely on the def-
inition of highly specialized, expert-handcrafted features to
achieve proper results, and this is actually critical for shallow
ML. There are different problems when addressing network
traffic measurements tasks using shallow ML approaches.
First, the lack of a consensual labeled raw traffic, full-packet
capture dataset to train ML models (e.g. due to privacy
policies in the data); second, the lack of a consensual set
of input features to tackle specific targets, such as network
security, anomaly detection, traffic classification, etc.; third,
the continuous changing in network measurements statistics
that may cause static handcrafted features to fail. To improve
these limitations, we explore the end-to-end application of
DL models to complement traditional approaches for network
measurement analysis, using different representations of the
input data. We introduce DeepMAL, a DL model capable
to detect and classify malware network traffic using raw,
bytestream-based data as input. We describe and evaluate
different DL architectures and different input representations,
showing an outstanding detection performance through the
analysis of raw bytestream packet data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section II
we present a brief state-of-the-art on DL models applied to
the analysis of network traffic measurements; in Section III
we present and provide details on the different DL approaches
and architectures behind DeepMAL; in Section IV we discuss
the detection performance achieved by different versions of
DeepMAL, comparing them with traditional, shallow-like
based models, using domain expert knowledge to craft the
input features; in Section V we introduce a variation of the
detection problem using a multi-class, malware classification
approach, and present concluding remarks in Section VI.
II. STATE-OF-THE-ART
The application of shallow, ML models to general network
measurement problems is largely extended in the literature.
There are a couple of extensive surveys and papers on network
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measurement problems such as network anomaly detection [6]
[5] - including ML-based approaches [4], ML for network
traffic classification [8] and network security [7]. A recent
survey on ML for networking is presented in [3], discussing
different applications and associated challenges.
DL approaches have started to be used recently with
promising performance results, mainly associated to traffic
classification tasks. In 2015, Z. Wang et al. [20] presented a
Deep Neural Network for feature learning using feed-forward
networks and Stacked Auto-Encoders (SAE) to perform net-
work protocol recognition over a dataset made up of TCP
flows from an internal network. In 2017 there have been some
works over the subject. W. Wang et al. presented two models
based upon a 2D-CNN [19] and 1D-CNN [17], in which the
authors transform network flows and sessions to images –
as done by [25], to work as an input for the CNN models,
using either the information of all the layers, or only from the
application layer. A similar image-based approach to traffic
classification was recently introduced in [18]. Lotfollahi et al.
[12] presented an approach for encrypted traffic classification
using SAE and 1D-CNN at the packet level. M. Lopez-Martin
et al. [11] presented different DL architectures based on CNN
and LSTM networks to perform traffic classification using
self-collected network traces. Additional papers based on DL
architectures for traffic classification cover the classification
of mobile networks encrypted traffic [21], [23] and the
classification of general network traffic [25], [29].
When it comes to intrusion and anomaly detection, there
are also many recent papers applying DL architectures.
Radford et al. [15] presented an anomaly detection model
using a LSTM network from network traffic logs for cyber-
security. Papers such as [24], [26] rely on the application
of CNNs to capture the underlying spatial correlations of
the analyzed data for intrusion detection, using already pre-
processed input features – e.g., [24], [26] use the well-known
KDD features and dataset. In [27], J. Cui et al. proposed
a word embedding-based approach to pre-analyze the raw
traffic data for network intrusion detection. H. Huang et al.
apply a multi-task learning approach to detect intrusions and
anomalies, using again CNNs. W. Wang et al. [22] propose
a hierarchical learning approach to construct spatio-temporal
features, combining spatial feature learning through CNNs
and temporal feature learning through recursive networks.
Finally, [13], [14] introduces RawPower, a DL architecture
for network anomaly and intrusion detection, which combines
spatio and temporal feature learning for detection. Most of
these proposals use DL models after some sort of prepro-
cessing of the data, or based on the definition of handcrafted
features to generate DL model inputs.
The main contribution of our approach is that of using
completely expert-knowledge-independent inputs for both the
prediction and classification tasks - just the raw bytestream,
opening the door to a broad set of potential applications of DL
in networking problems. Additional contributions include: (i)
the benchmarking of DeepMAL against shallow-like learning
models commonly used in the literature; (ii) addressing not
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Figure 1: Different input representation for DeepMAL.
only the problem of binary malware detection, but also the
classification of the specific class of malware detected; (iii)
the evaluation of DeepMAL on multiple different network
traffic datasets, publicly available from the well-known Strato-
sphere IPS Project of the CTU University of Prague in Czech
Republic [10].
III. DL FOR MALWARE DETECTION
Our goal is to train a DL model with the stream of
incoming bytes without requiring any preprocessing step or
domain expert intervention, to make the approach generic
and flexible. As we said before, we particularly focus on the
problem of malware traffic detection and classification, using
raw, bytestream-based data as input. The input representation
of the data, as well as the network architecture, are both
key elements to consider when building a DL model. Since
we want to evaluate the feature representation power of the
model from non-processed data, we consider two types of
raw representations: packets and flows. In both cases we
consider decimal normalized representation of every byte of
every packet as a different feature. Since different packets can
have different sizes, we set a fixed threshold n to trim each
incoming packet to the first n bytes, after removing potentially
biasing byte information such as MAC and IP addresses. All
packets with size larger than n bytes are trimmed, and packets
with smaller size are zero-padded. Next we describe basic
concepts behind DeepMAL’s architecture, and present the two
raw representations based on packets and flows, along with
the corresponding network architectures.
A. DL Architecture Basics
Finding the right DL architecture for a specific classifica-
tion task is challenging. In general, one would like to capture
different spatial and temporal correlations and phenomena
hidden within the specific input data. To capture both types of
correlations and learn spatio-temporal features, the proposed
DL architectures consider both convolutional and recurrent
neural networks as core layers. The convolutional layer(s)
are included to build the feature representation of the spatial
data inside packets and flows. The recurrent layers are used
together with the convolutional ones to improve detection
and classification performance, allowing the model to keep
track of temporal information. We additionally consider fully-
connected neural layers to deal with the different combi-
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Figure 2: DL architecture for Raw Packets representation.
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Figure 3: DL architecture for Raw Flows representation.
nations of features, to arrive to the final decision – i.e.,
classification rule.
Besides these core layers, we also include what we refer-to
as helper layers, which goal is to reduce the generalization er-
ror and to improve the learning process, reducing over-fitting
issues. As helper layers, we consider batch normalization
and dropout layers. Batch normalization is used to normalize
layer inputs for each mini-batch during training; as a result,
higher learning rates can be used, the resulting model is less
sensitive to initialization, and it additionally contributes to
the regularization of the model. The dropout layers are also
used to regularize the model, by doing the so-called model
averaging; dropout consists of randomly dropping units –
along with their connections, from the neural network during
training. In a nutshell, dropout is a very efficient way to
perform model averaging, as it is similar to train a huge
number of different networks and average the results.
Next, we use different combinations of these core and
helper layers to build the proposed architectures. In all cases,
we tried different combinations and network sizes, and keep
those combinations that provided the best empirical results. A
deeper and more structured analysis of the interplays among
these different layers is part of our ongoing work.
B. Input Representations
In the packet approach, we consider each packet as a
different instance, while in the flow approach we consider
a group of packets – that make up the flow – as an input
for the network. Both representations are depicted in Fig. 1.
For the Raw Packet representation, we have to choose the
number of bytes from the packet to consider (n), while in the
flow representation we also have to set the number of packets
per flow to consider (m). This is because, naturally, different
packets and flows can have different sizes.
Since both malware and normal captures are gathered
under controlled conditions, there is some bias in the IP and
transport protocol headers that are not representative of in the
wild traffic. This is the case, for example, of fixed values for
IP addresses and ports and even some of the transport protocol
flags. For this reason, we take the payload of every packet
as the key information to analyze and to build the dataset.
Afterwards, we set a fixed threshold for the parameter n to
trim each incoming packet to the first n bytes of payload.
All packets with size larger than n bytes are trimmed, and
packets with smaller size are zero-padded at the end. For the
number of packets per flow, we fix a number m and take the
first m packets of the flow, discarding the rest.
C. DeepMAL using Raw Packets
The architecture of DeepMAL for the Raw Packets input
representation is shown in Fig. 2. It consists of two 1D-CNN
convolutional layers of 32 and 64 filters of size 5, respectively;
a max-pooling layer of size 8 to down-sample the input;
a well-known LSTM as recursive layer, consisting of 200
units, returning the outputs of each cell (“return sequences”
mode on); and finally, two fully-connected (FC) layers of
200 units each. A binary cross-entropy is used as the loss
function. Spatial and normal batch normalization layers are
added after each 1D-CNN and FC layers to ease the training
process. Dropout layers are also used to add regularization to
the model.
D. DeepMAL using Raw Flows
When deciding on the network architecture for the Raw
Flows approach, we note that the number of instances to deal
with when operating at the flow level is by far much smaller
than in the case of packet-based inputs; as a consequence,
the capacity of the model does not have to be as high as
in the Raw Packets case. For this reason, we only include
convolutional layers in this architecture. The final architecture
(a) Normal traffic.
(b) Malware.
Figure 4: Payload size for normal and malware packets.
in this case consists of one single 1D-CNN layer of 32 filters
of size 5 and two fully-connected layers of 50 and 100 units
each. Also, binary cross-entropy is used as the loss function.
The architecture is shown in Fig. 3.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATIONS
We evaluate the different proposed DeepMAL architectures
and input representations using real network measurements,
publicly available though the Stratosphere IPS Project of the
CTU University of Prague in Czech Republic [10]. In this
section we focus exclusively on the problem of malware
detection, posing it as a binary classification task: either
normal instance or malware. To show the main advantages
of DeepMAL, we pose ourselves three evaluation questions:
(i) is it possible to achieve high detection accuracy with low
false alarm rates using the raw-input, DL-based models?; (ii)
are the proposed DL-based models better than the commonly
used shallow models for malware detection, when feeding
them all with raw inputs (e.g., byte-streams)?; and (iii) how
good are the raw-input, DL-based models as compared to a
traditional ML-based approach for malware detection, where
shallow models take as input specific hand-crafted features
based on domain expert knowledge?.
A. DeepMAL vs. Shallow Models with Raw Inputs
We begin with a simple evaluation scenario, detecting
malware at the packet level. We take a first dataset previously
used in the literature [19], referred to as the USTCTFC2016
dataset. This dataset consists of two groups of labeled pcap
files from malware and benign applications. The malware files
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Figure 5: Malware detection performance. Raw packet inputs,
DeepMAL vs. RF model.
contain 10 types of malware traffic from public websites, col-
lected from a real network environment by researchers of the
Czech Technical University in Prague (CTU) [10]. The benign
traffic contains 10 types of normal traffic which were col-
lected using Ixia BreakingPoint (https://www.ixiacom.com),
a network traffic simulation platform. We take every packet
from each labeled pcap as part of the dataset, using decimal
normalized representation of every byte as a different feature.
To set the number of bytes kept from each packets, we
resort to a simple, data-driven analysis of the dataset. Fig. 4
depicts the distribution of the packets payload size for (a) all
the normal or benign traffic samples, and (b) all the malware
packets. As clearly observed, both distributions are rather
similar for payload sizes below 750 bytes and above 1250
bytes, but markedly different between these two boundaries.
We therefore decided to set n = 1024 bytes, which proved
to be a reasonably good threshold to capture the difference
between benign and malware activity. Each packet is finally
labeled as either benign or malware, i.e., we consider a
binary classification problem. The total dataset consists of one
million samples (i.e., trimmed packets), half of them benign
and half of them coming from the malware traces. We split the
dataset on 80% of the samples for training, 10% for validation
and 10% for testing purposes. We built the model using the
Keras framework running on top of TensorFlow.
Fig. 5 presents the initial results obtained by the Raw
Packet DL model in the detection of malware packets, in the
form of a ROC curve. The model is compared to a Random
Forest (RF) model, using exactly the same input features and
an internal architecture of 100 trees. We choose a RF model
based on the generally outstanding detection performance
shown by the model in previous work [9], using domain
expert input features. DeepMAL can detect more than 70%
of the malware packets with a false alarm rate below 3%,
outperforming the RF model. Indeed, when applying the RF
model with the same set of raw input features, the obtained
results are very poor. These results point to the ability of the
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Figure 6: Learning performance (loss and accuracy evolution after each epoch) for Raw Flows and Raw Packets approaches.
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Figure 7: Malware detection performance using Raw Packets and Raw Flows representations.
DL-based model to better capture the underlying statistics
of the malware, without requiring any specific handcrafted
feature set. Still, the absolute detection performance is not
good enough to rely on such a DL model with raw packet
inputs for malware detection in the practice.
B. Packet vs. Flow Representation Performance
We take a step further an consider a similar comparison as
before, but considering now both raw packet and raw flow
representations as input. We take again publicly available
datasets from CTU, but to test on different scenarios, we
extend the mix of data by considering multiple pcap files. We
Representation Dataset size n (bytes) m (packets)
Raw Packets 248, 850 1024 –
Raw Flows 67, 494 100 2
Table I: Parametrization of DeepMAL’s input representation.
consider the same 10 different types of malware captures as
before, adding now 16 types of normal captures, choosing the
same number of packets for each capture to build a balanced
dataset (50% malware packets and 50% normal packets).
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Figure 8: Raw Flows vs. different shallow models.
In Table I we show the parameters selection for each input
representation. All of these parameters where selected again
from a statistical analysis of the datasets. Different from the
Raw Packet representation, we set n = 100 bytes for the Raw
Flows scenario, and keep only the first 2 packets of each flow,
i.e., m = 2. Note that such a small number of packets has
been already proved to be efficient in discriminating among
different types of applications when it comes to network
traffic classification [16].
We built two different datasets to fit each one of the
considered input representations. The dataset for the Raw
Packet representation consists of roughly 250, 000 instances.
For the Raw Flows representation, the dataset consists of
about 68, 000 instances. Both datasets are split according to
the same scheme as before: 80% of the samples for training,
10% for validation and 10% for testing.
The learning processes for both approaches is described in
Fig. 6. In both cases we used mini-batches for the parameters
update and we trained the models over several epochs (being
an epoch a single pass-through over the complete training
dataset). In the case of the Raw Packets representation, the
training was held over 100 epochs, while in the case of Raw
Flows we used 10 epochs. We used ADAM as the optimizer
function, annealing the learning rate over time. The perfor-
mance metric chosen in both cases was the accuracy, since
the dataset is balanced. For the Raw Packets representation we
achieved 77.6% of accuracy over the test set; while in the case
of Raw Flows we achieved an accuracy of 98.6% also over the
test set. Note that the learning process performs better when
operating at the flow level, as there is some potential over-
fitting for this scenario using the packet-level representation.
Fig. 7 compares the detection performance of both models
against a RF model using exactly the same (raw) input
features - in the Raw Flows case, we flatten the data to fit
the input to the RF. In both cases, the internal architecture
of the RF consisted of 100 trees using different pruning
techniques to prevent over-fitting (e.g., maximum depth, max-
imum number of instances per leaf, etc.). Once again, we
observe a clear out-performance of DeepMAL as compared
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Figure 9: Raw Flows vs. expert-knowledge-based inputs.
to the RF models, particularly when operating at the flow
level. For Raw Packets representations, DeepMAL can detect
about 65% of the malware traffic packets with a false alarm
rate below 3%, with an overall out-performance of nearly
15% as compared to the RF. Note that in this evaluation,
the differences in terms of performance are not as important
as in Fig. 5. The main differences occur when operating
with Raw Flows representations, where DeepMAL can detect
all malware flows with a false alarm rate below 2.5%, and
more than 90% of them with less than 0.5% of alarms. This
suggests that, when operating at the flow level, such raw input
representation and associated DL architecture can actually
provide highly accurate results, applicable in the practice.
For additional benchmarking purposes, we compare the
performance of the Raw Flows model against a broader set
of shallow ML models, using in all cases the computed
raw flows inputs for training and testing purposes. These
additional models include decision-trees (CART), naı¨ve bayes
(NB) models, neural networks (MLP), k-nearest-neighbors (k-
NN), and support vector machines (SVM). In all cases, we
resort to grid-based search to calibrate model parameters.
Fig. 8 depicts the obtained ROC curves for the tested
models. The corresponding AUC values are 0.998 (Raw
Flows), 0.928 (RF), 0.944 (SVM), 0.840 (k-NN), 0.835 (NB),
0.930 (MLP), and 0.869 (CART). Results reveal a clear out-
performance of DeepMAL as compared now to all the shallow
models; indeed, shallow models using raw, non processed
input features result in very poor performance.
C. Domain Knowledge vs. Raw Inputs
The last step of the evaluations tries to answer the third
question regarding the goodness and advantages of the pro-
posed approach w.r.t. the standard approach for machine-
learning based malware detection. In particular, we study how
good is the raw-flows, DL-based model as compared to a RF-
based model, the latter using as input specific hand-crafted
features based on domain expert knowledge.
The standard approach for detection of malware and net-
work attacks in network traffic is to rely on flow-level fea-
Botnet Protocol Activity
Neris IRC spam, click fraud
Rbot IRC DDoS
Virut HTTP spam, port scan
Table II: Protocols and attacks performed by different kinds
of selected botnets in the CTU dataset. Note that both Neris
and Virut are spam-based attacks.
tures, using traditional in-flow packet measurements such as
traffic throughput, packet sizes, inter-arrival times, frequency
of IP addresses and ports, transport protocols and shares of
specific flags (e.g., SYN packets), etc. We therefore build a set
of almost 200 of these features to feed a RF model. Note that
besides using traditional features such as min/avg/max values
of some of the input measurements, we also consider their
empirical distribution, sampling the empirical distribution at
many different percentiles. This provides as input much richer
information, as the complete distribution is taken into account.
We take the same dataset used in Sec. IV-B for training and
testing purposes.
Fig. 9 reports the results obtained in this scenario. Not sur-
prisingly, the RF using expert domain features achieves highly
accurate detection performance, detecting about 97% of all
the malware flows with less than 1% of false alarms. However,
also in this scenario, DeepMAL slightly outperforms this
domain expert knowledge based detector. As such, we can
conclude that the proposed DL architecture can perform as
good as a more traditional shallow-model based detector for
detection of malware flows, without requiring any sort of
expert handcrafted inputs. This of course, shows the great
contribution of DeepMAL.
Based on the three sets of evaluations, we can conclude
that the proposed DL model, in particular when using raw
flow representations as input, can: (i) provide highly accurate
and applicable-in-the-practice malware detection results, (ii)
capture the underlying malware and normal traffic models
better than traditionally used, shallow-like models, and (iii)
provide results as good as those obtained through a domain
expert knowledge-based detector, without requiring any sort
of hand-crafted features.
V. FROM MALWARE DETECTION TO CLASSIFICATION
To complement previous malware detection results, in this
section we present a variation of the binary classification
problem, considering now different sorts of malware traffic as
different classes, together with a “normal” class representing
benign traffic. In the CTU dataset, each capture represents a
different scenario, in which different sorts of malware were
executed using several protocols (e.g., IRC, HTTP, P2P, etc.)
and porting different types of attacks (e.g., DDoS, port scan,
click fraud, spam, etc.).
To build the dataset we considered three different mal-
ware traffic classes, corresponding to three different types
Class Accuracy Precision Recall F1 score
Normal 0.878 0.621 0.878 0.727
Neris 0.635 0.814 0.635 0.714
Rbot 0.999 1.000 0.999 1.000
Virut 0.547 0.679 0.547 0.606
Table III: DeepMAL malware classification performance.
of botnets, named Neris, Rbot, and Virut. Thus, our multi-
class classification problem has four different classes: three
representing malware attacks and one that represents normal
activity. The activity and protocols used in the scenarios
selected to build our dataset are reported in Table II. The
dataset consists of 160, 000 samples, built in a stratified way,
i.e., the dataset is balanced with 40, 000 samples per class.
For this classification task, we rely on the Raw Packets
representation. We do so to avoid reducing the dataset, as we
need more samples to avoid over-fitting when dealing with
multi-class problems. The DL model used for this task is
therefore quite similar to the one used for the Raw Packets
binary scenario. The difference is that now the activation
function used in the last fully connected layer is a Softmax
function – a generalization of the binary logistic regression
classifier for multiple classes, instead of the sigmoid used
for the binary classification. The corresponding loss function
is also different for the multi-class classification problem.
In this case we used a categorical cross-entropy, and the
learning process was held over 50 epochs. The evolution
of the learning process, including loss and accuracy after
each epoch, is very similar to the previous raw packets-based
model (cf. Fig. 6a), as both operate using a similar input
representation.
We also compare the performance of DeepMAL against
a RF, using the same input features. In Fig. 10 we show
the normalized confusion matrices for both models – note
that values are shown in percentages; the DL model clearly
outperforms the RF for all classes. As a sanity check, note
that the accuracy of the multi-class problem considering a
binary approach (malware vs. normal) holds similar results
as the Raw Packets approach presented in Sec. IV-B (77.6%
vs. 76.5%). To complement, in Table III we show additional
performance metrics for DeepMAL, including accuracy (AC),
precision (PR), recall (RC) and F1 score for each class. Values
are computed in a one-vs-all schema, in which each class is
evaluated against the rest. It is interesting to note that Rbot
botnet is detected with an accuracy of 99.9%, while Neris and
Virut achieve 63.5% and 54.7% each. It is likely that the fact
that both Neris and Virut share spam as an activity attack,
could actually be the root-cause behind the bad performance
to distinguish one from each other - see Table II. Interesting
is the fact that again, DeepMAL clearly outperforms the RF
model, for all variations of malware. As a general conclusion
of the multi-class problem, we observe that the raw packets
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Figure 10: Normalized confusion matrices (showing percent-
age values) for both Random Forest and DeepMAL.
representation does not provide discriminative enough input
for the proposed DL architecture to realize properly classifica-
tion results, but it still outperforms the benchmark RF model.
As part of our ongoing efforts, we are working on both testing
the multi-class problem using Raw Flows representations, as
well as on improving classification performance for the raw
packets input.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have presented two different approaches
using DL for the detection of malware network traffic,
considering raw representations of the input network data.
Different from traditional, shallow-based approaches, our
models operate with raw, byte stream inputs, without re-
quiring any type of handcrafted, expert domain knowledge-
based input features or feature engineering, providing an
extremely powerful approach. We proposed two different
DL architectures, relying on a combination of convolutional
and recurrent neural network layers, capable to learn spatio-
temporal features out of the raw inputs. Our results show that
using Raw Flows as input for the DL models achieves much
better results than using Raw Packets, achieving detection
performance which is comparable - or even better, than the
obtained by expert-domain knowledge. We also presented a
variation of the binary classification model using a multi-
class approach to discriminate between different types of
malware. In all cases, DL models outperform a strong RF
model used as benchmark, as well as other popular shallow-
like ML models commonly used in the network security
literature, using exactly the same raw input features. This
demonstrates the power of the proposed DL architectures and
data representations to better capture the underlying statistics
of malicious traffic, as compared to more traditional, shallow-
like models.
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